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Vapourware / Computer history / Product Design / Product 
concepts 
‘Vapourware’—computer hardware which is promoted as forth-
coming but which is never manufactured—has received little 
attention in Design History, although it is important. Vapourware 
often has a direct influence on the future development of com-
puting technology—causing competitors to reconsider, alter or 
even stop their planned activities. This paper shows that often, 
product concepts themselves influence market expectations or 
desires for future technological developments. Proof, in fact, of 
the agency of ideas.
1. Introduction
This paper discusses the phenomenon of ‘vapourware’—proto-
type designs for computers which reach the final stages of de-
velopment and are promoted as forthcoming products, but which 
then fall at the final hurdle before being offered for sale. They 
are often product concepts that stretch the very boundaries of 
proven technology or market territories, but which fall from view 
without trace.
Writers of Design History and the History of Technology have 
previously discussed different aspects of product failures, by 
turn taking the perspectives of Technological Determinism or the 
Social Construction of Technology (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch 1987) 
as analytical approaches to discuss the various explanations for 
the demise of different computer products. The reasons cited are 
legion, including the lack of a suitable market for a new product; 
the failure of a product to perform as expected or to ‘fit’ the needs 
of its target user group; the lack of a robust infrastructure of pe-
ripheral hardware or software; or ‘path dependency’—the stran-
glehold of established products proving too difficult to overthrow.
Vapourware products, by contrast, are not subject to these par-
ticular forces, as they are never actually exposed to the acid test 
of market success. Vapourware ‘fails’ (if indeed it can be said to 
fail at all) for different reasons–often, but not always, the inability 
to make a new technology reliably functional; the lack of available 
funding required to fully develop or productionize prototypes; or 
the missing of a particularly narrow window of opportunity for a 
new product in a rapidly and ever-changing technological market.
The fact that vapourware doesn’t get to market, though, does not 
mean that it is of no importance. The fact these products are an-
nounced if not sold is a key aspect, as it means the function and 
form of an intended product are known to an audience, even if the 
actual product does not appear. Through numerous case studies, 
this research has shown that such announcements often have 
a direct, causal influence on the future development of comput-
ing technology—causing competing companies to either rush to 
market, change direction, or drop their own lines of product devel-
opment completely. The promotion of non-existent products has 
even been key in competitors creating completely new markets 
for products that perhaps otherwise would never have appeared.
2. Early Vapourware
The computing industry has a longer history than many imagine, 
especially if one traces the origins of calculating devices back to 
the abacus. Even discounting such simple devices to concentrate 
only those enabling automatic programmable calculation, the 
history goes back almost 200 years. Interestingly, so too does 
the history of vapourware. In fact, wherever there has been a 
computer of any description successfully marketed, there have 
been associated examples of machines that did not go into pro-
duction at all. 
Figure 1. Reconstruction of Babbage’s Difference Engine, 1991. The 
first piece of vapourware? (photo by Doron Swade).
One of the people most commonly labelled by historians of com-
puting as the ‘father’ of the computer, Charles Babbage, has been 
described as being ‘equally famous for two things: for inventing 
vast computers, and for failing to build them’ (Swade 2004). 
Starting in 1821, Babbage spent the last 50 years of his life trying 
to perfect his Difference Engine and his Analytical Engine—huge 
mechanical contraptions that would produce error-free math-
ematical calculations. Babbage’s ongoing efforts were widely 
celebrated in late Georgian and Victorian England. His highly am-
bitious design for the Difference Engine (fig. 1) called for the ac-
curate assembly of 25,000 precision-engineered parts, but after 
a decade of development and the spending of the then enormous 
sum of over £17,000 of public money, all he achieved was a pro-
totype mechanism—a small part of one section of the machine. 
His work, though, inspired many who followed in his footsteps, in-
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cluding the Swedish inventor Pehr Georg Scheutz, to create work-
ing difference engines such as the Scheutzian Calculation Engine 
of 1837, albeit of lesser capability than Babbage’s proposal. The 
government finally withdrew from funding Babbage in 1842, at 
which point, his prototype section was consigned to a museum. 
Yet it is a testament to how advanced and influential this design 
was that, forty years after its conception, it was displayed in 
London alongside other commercially available calculators at the 
International Exhibition of 1862. The exhibition showcased the 
latest advances in technology, and the jurors of the Exhibition 
stated that Babbage’s machine was still of ‘a higher order’ than 
those available. (Purbrick 1993). Babbage’s inability to complete 
the machine was thought for many years to have been due to the 
limitations of Victorian manufacturing technology. However, in 
order to celebrate 200 years of Babbage’s birth, the Science Mu-
seum in London recreated his Difference Engine in 1991 using 
manufacturing processes and tolerances achievable in his time, 
and it worked perfectly.
3. Personal Vapourware
At every stage of the computer’s development into the machines 
we know today, there have been examples of vapourware that 
have had influence on the wider computer industry. As comput-
ers began to be manufactured by more companies, the opportu-
nities for machines to be developed but not released increased 
accordingly. Often, this was because smaller companies set up 
to manufacture computers with little experience and few re-
sources, but occasionally such drawbacks occurred in the larg-
est, most experienced and best resourced companies.
IBM was one such company. The world leaders in business com-
puting had, by the mid 1950s, built 70% of all the computers in 
the world. Consequently, when one of their own directors, Bill 
Lowe, told them in the early 1970s that business computers 
would be replaced by personal computers, the Executive Board 
would not listen. In the mid 1970s, Lowe had in-house Industrial 
Designer, Tom Hardy, produce working prototypes of home com-
puters—small, powerful, brightly coloured machines that used 
a domestic television as a display (a low-cost route eventually 
adopted by most manufacturers). Despite these being radical 
proposals that would have established IBM as clear leaders in a 
new market, the executives were not convinced of the potential 
for personal computers. In 1977, three competitors launched 
successful home computers that together, kick started a whole 
industry. By 1978, the Commodore PET 2001, the Apple II and the 
Tandy TRS-80 had sold in their thousands, and IBM executives 
started to take notice. When the spreadsheet package VisiCalc 
for the Apple II was launched in 1979, Apple became a threat to 
the office computer market, and they really started to worry. 
Finally, the Executive Board asked Lowe to produce a personal 
computer. 
It was no secret that IBM was not the fastest in producing new 
products. In fact, the internal processes were so convoluted that 
it took three years to go from concept to production. Lowe knew 
that this was far too long for an industry that was moving more 
quickly than ever before. The only chance of getting a product to 
market quickly enough was to bypass the usual processes, but 
he knew he would never be given permission to do so. To force 
the issue, Lowe met with a smaller company that had recently 
launched a home computer used mainly for playing games. 
Unbeknown to management, he had one of these products up-
graded, redesigned by Hardy into a package that followed IBMs 
design language, and badged it as an IBM product. He then pre-
sented it to the board, saying that the only way they could get 
into the market fast enough was to buy this smaller company 
and rebadge their products. The board was not amused. The very 
idea that the largest computer company in the world would be re-
duced to buying a ‘toy’ was complete anathema. Lowe then told 
them that the only alternative was to give him complete freedom 
to disregard IBMs internal processes to get a product to market 
within a year. Stunned, the board agreed and Lowe went outside 
of IBM to use many off-the-shelf components to build the IBM 
PC (fig. 2). It proved to be one of the most successful computer 
designs of all time, and became the industry standard. But this 
was partly due to the fact that, because of its construction from 
existing parts, others could so easily copy it, which proved to be 
the thin end of the wedge in the decline of IBMs fortunes.
4. Portable Vapourware
Xerox, the world’s largest manufacturers of photocopiers, was 
another well resourced but risk averse company. Aware that 
their patents on photocopiers were about to expire, releasing 
their stranglehold on the industry, Xerox assembled a team of 
the best computer researchers in their Palo Alto Research Center 
(PARC) and set them to invent new products. PARC were excep-
tionally good at this, although almost nothing they created made 
it successfully to market. One example was the Xerox Notetaker. 
As soon as he arrived at PARC in 1970, its designer, Alan Kay, in-
spired many people to try and develop a truly portable computer 
through his vision of the ‘Dynabook’—a computer that looked like 
a large notepad, that could be drawn on with a pen, and was so 
simple to operate that even a child could use it (Atkinson 2008). 
Figure 2. The IBM PC, 1981. The direct result of a vapourware 
proposal (courtesy of IBM Archives).
Design Frontiers: Territiories, Concepts, Technologies 578
ATKINSON, Paul
The Dynabook was technologically out of reach at the time, al-
though Kay was convinced he could make it happen if he were 
given the necessary backing. Xerox management were not sup-
portive, and so in 1975, Kay started building a computer that was 
a ‘stepping stone’ towards his grander vision. The result, the Xerox 
Notetaker (fig. 3), had much of the capability of a larger computer 
system being developed at PARC, the Alto, which was the first with 
a Graphical User Interface (GUI) operated by a mouse. When the 
technology of the Alto was crammed into the Notetaker, it was the 
size of a small suitcase and had a small touch-sensitive screen, 
a floppy disk drive, a GUI operating system, 128k of memory 
(powerful for the time) and network capability. It also boasted 
a microphone, stereo speakers, and a rechargeable battery. The 
components alone were worth around ten thousands dollars 
(Hiltzik 2000). The downside was the weight—over 20kg (45 lbs), 
meaning there was no way it could be carried by children, and not 
easily by adults. By June 1978, Kay’s team had produced ten fully 
working prototypes to show Xerox management that it was in-
deed possible to produce a high-performance portable computer. 
It was tested in the field, and even used successfully during air-
plane flights. The team spent the best part of a year presenting 
the Notetaker to Xerox executives across the country, but despite 
numerous promises, nothing happened. In despair, Kay left and 
never returned to PARC. The Notetaker was never put into produc-
tion, but Adam Osborne, who was well aware of Kay’s design, built 
an almost identical, much cheaper, less capable but just as heavy 
computer, the Osborne 1, This is often stated as being the first suc-
cessful mass-produced portable computer and despite its draw-
backs was massively influential, spawning numerous clones from 
competitors and defining the accepted form of portable comput-
ing for a number of years until the appearance of cheaper laptops.
5. Pen-based Vapourware
One of the best-documented cases of vapourware was part of a 
development in the computer industry that promised a whole new 
world of computing products. Pen Computing, a method of interact-
ing with computers by writing commands onto the screen rather 
than typing instructions, was hailed as the future for computers 
with complete certainty by those involved. At one point in the early 
1990s, almost every computer manufacturer was developing a pen-
based machine (Atkinson 2008). The GO Computer was the product 
everyone was talking about, and its writing-based operating sys-
tem, PenPoint, was seen as a more natural, intuitive way to interact 
with computers (Kaplan, 1994). Computers that were operated with 
pens had been produced a few years before, but these were half-
way houses—machines that used existing mouse and keyboard-
operated interfaces and merely replaced the mouse with a pen and 
the keyboard with an onscreen version. True Pen Computing offered 
much more—full handwriting recognition and whole commands 
that could be replaced with gestures made by single strokes of the 
pen in electronic ink. The computer industry
 was very excited about the possibilities.
Figure 4. The non-existent GO Computer was even reviewed in magazines (photo 
of cover by author).
From the word go, GO made no secret about its intentions, and 
had announced its forthcoming product as soon as it had a work-
ing prototype (fig. 4). The problem was that the prototype was 
nowhere near production quality, and a whole series of technical 
problems kept emerging, sending the development team back 
to the drawing board. It proved impossible to write on the LCD 
screens without damage, the addition of a sheet of glass made 
the pen appear to ‘float’ above the ‘ink’ on screen, the components 
that tracked the position of the pen wouldn’t work properly, and 
assembled prototypes burst into flames for no apparent reason. 
The expensive product development process meant that the direc-
tors had to constantly search for more financial backing and sign 
parts of the company over to strategic partners in recompense. 
The lengthy delays also gave the competition, namely Microsoft, 
the time to announce their own version of essentially the same 
device and give mocked-up video presentations of their designs 
in use, giving the impression they had a finished product almost 
ready to launch (which they didn’t). As a result, all the develop-
ers that were writing third-party software for GO switched to work 
with Microsoft. In the end, GO created a spin-off company, EO, 
to manufacture the hardware and changed direction to become 
purely a software company. By this time, the industry was start-
ing to become very disillusioned with the whole Pen Computing 
Figure 3. The Osborne 1, 1981. Closely based on a piece of vapourware (cour-
tesy of oldcomputers.net).
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project, and the bottom fell out of the market before it had even 
got going. Manufacturers continued to try and develop and launch 
products, but with little success. Pen Computing took a different 
route, and emerged in far more successful but less capable prod-
ucts in the form of hand-held Personal Digital Assistants (PDA’s).
6. Conclusions
There are obviously far more cases of vapourware than there is 
room to discuss here, but even these few examples demonstrate 
the different and significant impacts that immaterial products 
can have. Babbage’s Difference Engine and the Xerox Notetaker 
both inspired others to make significant advances and success-
fully produce real products that had a tangible effect on the direc-
tion of computing, even if the machines they produced did not 
reach the technical heights of the original concepts. The dream 
of Pen Computing embodied in the GO Computer drove the whole 
industry to explore a possible alternate path for computers and 
the creation of myriad products that pushed the boundaries of 
computer technology, even if those products went on to fail in the 
marketplace. The widespread public dissemination of the concept 
raised awareness among potential users and made them consid-
er what computers could be like, arguably clearing the way for the 
ready acceptance of smaller, simpler pen operated devices in the 
form of PDAs. The personal computer prototypes produced within 
IBM had a very specific and localised impact, but nevertheless 
were directly responsible for the creation of a product that com-
pletely altered the course of computer history and opened up the 
computer industry to a much wider range of manufacturers. Indi-
rectly, this led to the widespread mass production of compatible 
machines, huge reductions in the cost of computers and support-
ed a change of the perception of the computer from a high-end 
specialist piece of equipment to a quotidian, status-free product. 
These are not the only effects of vapourware, but they at least 
prove a significant point. While the focus of much of design his-
tory focuses on the consumption of mass produced products, 
and great play is rightly made of the powerful forces of social 
construction, there remains an area of study of products which 
never made it into manufacture, never appeared in the retail mar-
ket, were never subjected to the capricious test of public opinion 
and yet which still had significant effects of the development of 
computer history. The mere concepts themselves were enough. 
These pieces of vapourware are indeed proof, if any was ever 
needed, of the agency of ideas.
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